On 11 July 1946, US Secretary of State James Byrnes at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the four allied states proposed the economic unification of the occupation zones.

Even before the end of the war, the Allies considered various options for Germany’s post-war order. According to the American Morgenthau Plan, Germany should have lost the ability to compete economically with other countries. At the same time, Britain sought the “spiritual integration” of Germany with western countries. France insisted on the toughest possible decisions. Yet, Charles de Gaulle was not invited to the Potsdam Conference, and France, feeling humiliated, took a special position and always recalled that it had nothing to do with the decisions of the conference. The Soviet Union, following its interests, tried to ensure access to power for Communists. Thus, the partition of Germany was the result of collective decisions.

Germany’s economy was destroyed by the war. Neither the United Kingdom nor France was able - or willing - to provide any aid to the defeated Germans. The burden of Germany’s recovery was borne by the United States and the Soviet Union. The blatant discord between the Allies made it impossible to unite the economies of the four zones.

The pragmatic Americans put forward the theory of the “economic magnet”: having seen the economic success of the united British and American zones, the so-called Bizon, the two remaining parts would decide to join it as well. In actuality it only worked with the French zone, while the GDR remained within the communist sphere.

Source: Nicolas Lewkowicz. The German Question and the Origins of the Cold War. Milan, Italy: IPOC. 2008