On 6 May 1946, Arseny Zverev, Minister of Finance and chairman of the State Bank of the USSR, sent a memo to Lavrentiy Beria, Deputy Chairman of USSR’s Council of Ministers, entitled “On Currency Circulation in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War and the Need for Monetary Reform”. This would be the first step towards monetary reform in 1947.
The Soviet Union's financial system suffered greatly during the war: in 1941 alone, there was a budget deficit of 19 billion roubles, which had to be balanced by printing money throughout the war. The stock of goods declined sharply, and trade turnover dropped. The card-based distribution of consumer goods led to the growth of a black market, and a hierarchy of shady dealers began to form, whose influence reached unprecedented levels.
In foreign policy, the stable rouble was supposed to become the reserve currency of the emerging socialist camp – but the financial system of the Soviet Union lacked strength.
The authors of the reform had no scientifically sound methodology for such interventions. The reform would be confiscatory in nature. While pursuing the goal of taking speculative money out of circulation, its authors would ignore the labour nature of a large part of the population's savings. “As for the broad segments of workers, clerks and collective farmers, they do not have large cash savings”, Zverev wrote.
Source:
Igor Chudnov, “How the strength of the ‘world's strongest currency’ was measured: Methods of calculating the gold content and rouble exchange rate in the 1930s-1950s”, Herald of INGECON (Vestnik INZhEKONa). Series: Economics. – 2010.